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ARTICLES 
TRUTH IN ADVERTISING: APPLYING 
COMMERCIAL SPEECH REGULATIONS TO 
THE SECONDARY DISSEMINATION OF 
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH PUBLICATIONS 
CODY CORLISS† 
INTRODUCTION 
As the biological substance that coats the surface of the 
lungs, surfactant is critical to human life.  Surfactants play a key 
role in lung function by facilitating the transfer of oxygen from 
inhaled air into the blood stream.  Although the human body 
naturally produces surfactants, premature babies often cannot 
produce an adequate surfactant level required for proper lung 
functioning.  As a result, such babies are particularly susceptible 
to lung collapse and Respiratory Distress Syndrome, a condition 
that can cause respiratory failure and death. 
A number of nonbiological surfactant solutions are available 
to keep neonatal infants breathing.  ONY, a biopharmaceutical 
company in New York, produces one such product called 
“Infasurf,” which is derived from bovine lung surfactant.  ONY’s 
chief competitor Chiesi and its American distributor Cornerstone 
Therapeutics offer a competing surfactant called “Curosurf,” 
which is derived from porcine lung mince. 
† Associate Legal Officer, Office of the Prosecutor, United Nations International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; A.B., Harvard University; M.A., 
Universiteit Leiden; J.D., Cornell Law School. The origins of this Article grew out of 
the author’s experience on Lanham Act litigation while working as an associate at 
K&L Gates LLP. The opinions in this article are the author’s own and do not reflect 
the opinions of the United Nations or his former employer. The author is grateful to 
Professors Yvette Liebesman, Ryan Vacca, Rebecca Tushnet, Mark Lemley, and Eric 
Goldman for the thoughtful suggestions and comments that undoubtedly improved 
this Article. 
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The two products compete in the marketplace and champion 
the relative superiority of their respective surfactant products. 
As part of its research program, Chiesi, the manufacturer of 
Curosurf, hired a number of medical doctors to research the 
effectiveness of its product.  The doctors’ study determined that 
neonatal infants using Chiesi’s product are more likely to survive 
than neonatal infants given ONY’s Infasurf.  After concluding 
their research, the doctors published their findings in a medical 
journal.  Once that scientific article was published, Chiesi and 
Cornerstone issued press releases touting the article’s 
conclusions and distributed its own promotional materials that 
cited and quoted the scientific publication.  ONY offered a 
vigorous rebuttal: company scientists wrote letters to scientific 
journals that rebutted the Chiesi study’s research methodology. 
Most interestingly for the purposes of this Article, ONY also filed 
suit regarding Chiesi and Cornerstone’s scientific claims, alleging 
that use of the scientific article’s conclusions in Chiesi’s 
promotional materials violated the Lanham Act. 
Is the science in the journal and its resulting promotional 
use commercial promotion subject to regulation under the 
Lanham Act, the federal statute regulating false advertising and 
promotion?  The United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit held that it was not1:  “[A]s a matter of law, statements of 
scientific conclusions about unsettled matters of scientific debate 
cannot give rise to liability for damages sounding in 
defamation.”2  The court went even further, concluding that “the 
secondary distribution of excerpts of such an article cannot give 
rise to liability, so long as the excerpts do not mislead a reader 
about the conclusions of the article.”3 
One year later, the Fifth Circuit took up a different false 
advertising case also stemming from the publication of scientific 
findings.4  There, Eastman Chemical Company, the 
manufacturer of a plastic resin product used in water bottles and 
food containers, filed suit against two of its competitors, 
PlastiPure and CertiChem.5  Eastman alleged that its 
competitors made false and misleading statements in violation of 
1 ONY, Inc. v. Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc., 720 F.3d 490, 492 (2d Cir. 2013). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Eastman Chem. Co. v. Plastipure, Inc., 775 F.3d 230, 233 (5th Cir. 2014). 
5 Id. at 233–34. 
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the Lanham Act when they claimed that Eastman’s products 
leached chemicals capable of causing human harm.6  Like in 
ONY, a scientific article was the center of the controversy.7  Here, 
CertiChem-backed scientists published an article in a peer-
reviewed scientific journal claiming that Eastman Chemicals 
products had the potential to activate estrogen receptors in the 
human body and trigger hormone-dependent cancers.8  After 
research on the article was completed, but before the article’s 
publication, PlastiPure published a three-page sales brochure 
that noted the research.  The sales brochure contained a chart 
that depicted Eastman Chemical’s products as having significant 
levels of estrogen-triggering activity (“EA”).9  At trial, the jury 
found for Eastman, finding that PlastiPure and CertiChem had 
made false advertising statements about Eastman’s product, 
thereby violating the Lanham Act.10  The Fifth Circuit agreed 
that the Lanham Act applied to the use of the scientific findings 
in PlastiPure’s advertising, reasoning that “[a]dvertisements do 
not become immune from Lanham Act scrutiny simply because 
their claims are open to scientific or public debate.”11 
The First Amendment protects academic freedom, scientific 
inquiry, and scientific publication, but what protection applies 
when scientific findings are distributed as commercial speech 
outside their initial academic realm?  Commercial speech is 
subject to the Lanham Act prohibition against false or misleading 
statements of fact used in advertising or promotion.  At what 
point does protected scientific inquiry transform into commercial 
speech that is subject to the stricter Lanham Act scrutiny?  These 
two recent circuit court decisions have only blurred the 
distinction; the two decisions differed on whether commercial 
speech standards apply when false or misleading scientific 
results are distributed beyond their initial academic spheres. 
The result is an uneven judicial landscape on the evaluation of 
false advertising claims involving scientific research.  This 
Article examines the peculiarities of the Lanham Act and the use 
of scientific findings in advertising or promotion.  This Article 
6 Id. at 234. 
7 ONY, Inc., 720 F.3d at 492. 
8 Eastman Chem. Co.,775 F.3d at 233–34. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 234. 
11 Id. at 236. 
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also argues that the Fifth Circuit’s Eastman decision is the better 
model than what is used in the Second Circuit.  If the 
distribution of noncommercial speech serves any commercial 
purpose, the speech becomes commercial and is regulated by the 
Lanham Act.  Although the Second Circuit noted that “it is the 
essence of the scientific method that the conclusions of empirical 
research are tentative and subject to revision,”12 the Lanham Act 
holds distributers to a higher standard.13  A distributor of 
academic statements in advertising or promotion must guarantee 
that the statements and findings it distributes are true so as not 
to mislead the public.  Sophisticated scientists may understand 
that academic research articles are subject to later revision, but 
the general population is less likely to understand such a 
distinction.  The ONY holding will immunize advertisers who 
rely on science, to the ultimate detriment of consumers who are 
likely to believe that scientific findings constitute “facts.” 
Part I of this Article examines the Lanham Act generally and 
the Act’s regulation of commercial speech.  Part II reviews the 
interplay between the Lanham Act and the First Amendment 
protections afforded to scientific inquiry and scientific 
publication.  It then examines the secondary dissemination of 
scientific findings, arguing that a third party’s dissemination of 
the scientific findings or a press release quoting those findings 
constitutes commercial speech that should be regulated by the 
Lanham Act.  This Article explores how the recent ONY decision 
has the potential to chill Lanham Act litigation, and it argues 
that future decisions following ONY’s logic could foreclose 
Lanham Act litigation where the truth of scientific findings may 
be at issue.  Lastly, this Article contends that future Lanham Act 
decisions should instead follow the logic of the Fifth Circuit’s 
Eastman decision, which properly keeps the secondary 
dissemination of scientific publications under the ambit of the 
Lanham Act. 
12 ONY, Inc., 720 F.3d at 496. 
13 See Eastman Chem. Co., 775 F.3d at 236. 
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I. HISTORY OF THE LANHAM ACT & KEY ELEMENTS TO
CONSIDER FOR SCIENTIFIC SPEECH USED IN COMMERCIAL
ADVERTISING 
A. General Background of the Lanham Act Regulating
Commercial Speech
An understanding of the Lanham Act and its effect on
commercial speech can best be understood through an 
examination of the history and elements of the Act.  As an initial 
matter, § 43(a) of the Lanham Act proscribes false statements or 
false representations made in commercial advertising or 
promotion.14  The Lanham Act provides a private right of action 
for unfair competition claims based on false advertising.15  In 
recent years, the Lanham Act has become a powerful tool in the 
battle for market supremacy.  A Lanham Act suit from a 
competitor can stall a new or rising entrant in the marketplace 
and increase a rival’s cost of doing business.16  Given its power as 
a business weapon, an examination of Lanham Act suits suggests 
that many are unlikely to have much impact on consumer 
welfare.17  Moreover, as one scholar argued, the threat of Lanham 
14 Trademark Act of 1946 § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
15 § 1125(a)(1). 
16 Jean Wegman Burns, Confused Jurisprudence: False Advertising Under the 
Lanham Act, 79 B.U. L. REV. 807, 809 (1999). 
17 See, e.g., Abdallah v. Pileggi, No. 97-1581, 1998 WL 180491, at *1 (Fed. Cir. 
Apr. 17, 1998) (alleging that a company falsely represented that its necktie was 
patented); United Indus. Corp. v. Clorox Co., 140 F.3d 1175, 1178 (8th Cir. 1998) 
(claiming that an advertisement’s wording and images misrepresented that it killed 
roaches within twenty-four hours); Castrol Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d 939, 941 
(3d Cir. 1993) (claiming that a motor oil company deceptively claimed its product 
“outperforms any leading motor oil against viscosity breakdown”); Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp. v. Suarez Corp. Indus., No. 98 Civ. 1711(WK), 1998 WL 
126065, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1998) (claiming a necklace was not an authorized 
copy of a piece of jewelry in a movie); Avon Prods., Inc. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 
984 F. Supp. 768, 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (claiming that a lotion did not actually act as 
a bug repellent); Playtex Prods., Inc. v. Gerber Prods. Co., 981 F. Supp. 827, 828 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (alleging falsity where competitor falsely represented that its cup 
was fifty percent easier to drink from than a competitor’s cup); Heublein, Inc. v. E & 
J Gallo Winery, Inc., No. 94CIV.9155 (JFK)(AJP), 1995 WL 168846, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 7, 1995) (claiming that an alcoholic drink was mislabeled “Margarita” when it 
only contained margarita flavoring and no tequila); Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Del 
Monte Corp., No. 93 CV. 4413, 1993 WL 557864, at *42 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1993) 
(claiming that “gelatin” was used on a product that was not actually vegetable 
based); Complaint at ¶ 3, Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC v. Bridgestone Ams., Inc., 
No. C 12 4753 LB, 2012 WL 4339671 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2012) (claiming that a tire 
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Act litigation leads companies to avoid “hard-edged, but truthful, 
advertising” in favor of safe, less-informative ads that are less 
likely to provide grounds for a Lanham Act suit.18 
B. The History of the Lanham Act and Its 1988 Amendments
In its sixty years of existence, the Lanham Act, the chief U.S.
law regulating commercial speech, has provided a flexible legal 
framework to regulate competition in the marketplace.19  An 
understanding of the Act and its history is important to 
understand the legal interpretations regarding the Lanham Act 
and the regulation of commercial speech.20 
In 1946, Congress passed the Lanham Act, formally 
codifying the federal trademark law,21 to “place all matters 
relating to trade-marks in one statute and to eliminate judicial 
obscurity, to simplify registration and to make it stronger and 
more liberal, to dispense with mere technical prohibitions and 
arbitrary provisions, to make procedure simple, and relief 
against infringement prompt and effective.”22  Although, in the 
words of one court, the Lanham Act brought the “creation of a 
‘new statutory tort’ intended to secure a market-place free from 
deceitful marketing practices,”23 the Act was rarely invoked for 
company’s commercials misled the public when it hired an actor who had previously 
appeared in a series of video game commercials). 
18 Burns, supra note 16, at 809. 
19 See Joseph D. Garon, The Lanham Act: A Living Thing, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 55, 56 (1996) (writing that the Lanham Act has proven to 
be a flexibility to adapt to vast and unpredictable changes in the business world); id. 
at 56 n.6 (“Like our U.S. Constitution which was drafted by the framers to be 
applicable and adaptable in any age, so too can the Lanham Act be interpreted to 
apply to current legal problems and to deal with changing political, economic and 
moral issues.” (quoting Randy Lipsitz, Judging by Appearance: How the Lanham Act 
Protects Product Shapes; Issue Continues To Confound Lawyers, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 2, 
1996, at S4)). 
20 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common 
Sense, 108 Yale L.J. 1687, 1710–15 (1999) (arguing that courts should not construe 
the Lanham Act as a broad anticopying statute partly because some commercial 
uses of a trademark are important in societal discourse); Rebecca Tushnet, 
Trademark Law as Commercial Speech Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REV. 737, 737–39 
(2007) (noting the difficulties of establishing clear boundaries between commercial 
speech regulated by the Lanham Act and the First Amendment). 
21 Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, § 46(a), 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
22 S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3 (1946), as reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 
1274. 
23 Johnson & Johnson v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 631 F.2d 186, 189 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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the first thirty years following its enactment.24  In the 1970s and 
1980s, however, a significant increase in Lanham Act related 
litigation greatly expanded the scope of the Act beyond mere 
trademark infringement and into the realm of alleged deceitful 
statements about products or services.25 
Prior to 1988, nearly all Lanham Act cases involved 
traditional advertising.26  A revision of the Act by Congress in 
1988 set the stage for the further regulation of commercial 
speech.27  As part of these revisions, Congress rewrote § 43(a). 
The two parts of § 43(a) concern (1) false designations of origins 
and (2) false advertising or promotion.28  The pertinent section 
reads: 
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or
services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word,
term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or
any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of
fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which—
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive
as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person
with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities
by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the
nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or
her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that
he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.29
24 Burns, supra note 16, at 816 (describing the Lanham Act as being “largely 
dormant for almost thirty-five years”). 
25 See id. at 816–17; Ashley N. Calhoun, Comment, Winking in the Dark: An 
Analysis of Corrective-Advertising Damages Under the Lanham Act and the Effect on 
the American Economy, 32 STETSON L. REV. 821, 825 (2003). 
26 Burns, supra note 16, at 819. 
27 See Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 132, 102 
Stat. 3935, 3946 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012)). The 
amendments took effect in 1989. 
28 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). 
29 Id. 
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The legislative history regarding the revisions has increased 
confusion, rather than clarified matters.30  The Senate Report 
noted that the modifications to § 43(a) were designed “to codify 
the interpretation [that § 43(a)] has been given by the courts.”31  
Still, as one scholar noted, the 1988 Congressional revisions 
overruled some aspects of prior case law.32  For example, where 
Congress made the new § 43(a)(1)(B) applicable to the 
misrepresentations about a plaintiff’s product, Congress 
overruled prior lower court decisions interpreting the original 
§ 43(a) to apply only to statements about a defendant’s own
product.33  Legal decisions in the intervening years have largely
established the Lanham Act principles that the 1988
congressional reforms failed to clarify.34
30 See, e.g., Burns, supra note 16, at 820 (writing that the scant legislative 
history and the actual text of that history “creates as much confusion as clarity”); 
Frank Z. Hellwig, The Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988: The 100th Congress 
Leaves Its Mark, 79 TRADEMARK REP. 287, 311 (1989) (noting that “due to a lack of a 
unifying legislative history, the drawback is that [§ 43(a)] will continue to be a 
source of much controversy and litigation necessary to clarify it”). 
31 S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 2 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 
5603. 
32 Burns, supra note 16, at 821 (writing that Congress intentionally overruled 
prior case law). 
33 See, e.g., U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 898 F.2d 914, 921 (3d Cir. 1990); 
Bernard Food Indus., Inc. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d 1279, 1283 (7th Cir. 1969); Skil 
Corp. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 782–83 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (allowing an 
action based on false statements in comparative advertising where a defendant 
allegedly misrepresented both its product and the plaintiff’s product). 
34 For example, although the Lanham Act is often regarded as a consumer 
welfare statute and the language of the congressional direction suggested that 
consumers were intended to have standing, a recent United States Supreme Court 
decision affirmed the widespread federal court decisions that held that Lanham Act 
standing is not available to the actual consumers who are injured by false 
advertising. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 
1388 (2014) (“Read literally, that broad language [of § 43(a)] might suggest that an 
action is available to anyone who can satisfy the minimum requirements of Article 
III. No party makes that argument, however, and the ‘unlikelihood that Congress
meant to allow all factually injured plaintiffs to recover persuades us that [§ 1125(a)]
should not get such an expansive reading.’ ” (second alteration in original) (quoting
Holmes v. Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 266 (1992))); see also Conte Bros.
Auto., Inc. v. Quaker State-Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 229 (3d Cir. 1998)
(“Conferring standing to the full extent implied by the text of § 43(a) would give
standing to parties, such as consumers, having no competitive or commercial
interests affected by the conduct at issue.”), abrogated by Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. at 1391–93. Federal courts have unanimously rejected the right of consumers to
bring a suit under the Lanham Act. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. 134 S. Ct. at 1390 (“A
consumer who is hoodwinked into purchasing a disappointing product may well have
an injury-in-fact cognizable under Article III, but he cannot invoke the protection of
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C. The Lanham Act’s Key Elements
To prevail on a false advertising claim, the traditional
analysis is that a plaintiff must prove five elements: (1) the 
existence of a defendant’s false statement of fact about its own or 
another product in a commercial advertisement; (2) that the 
statement actually deceived or had the tendency to deceive a 
substantial segment of the audience; (3) materiality—that is, 
likelihood that a purchasing decision was influenced—of the 
deception; (4) that the statement entered interstate commerce 
due to the defendant; and (5) injury or likelihood of injury to the 
plaintiff, whether by loss of sales to defendant or loss of goodwill 
associated with plaintiff’s products, as a result of the defendant’s 
false statement.35  Interstate commerce is an element of the 
Lanham Act that is nearly always met.36  In addition, the injury 
the Lanham Act—a conclusion reached by every Circuit to consider the question.”). 
Instead, standing confers to competitors or others active in the marketplace that 
might be harmed by false representations in commercial speech. Id. (“[A] plaintiff 
must allege an injury to a commercial interest in reputation or sales.”); Harold H. 
Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 798 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Deterioration 
of competitive position is precisely the kind of injury the Lanham Act was intended 
to redress.”). Industry competitors or another company active in the marketplace 
must bring suit against the company allegedly engaging in false or misleading 
advertising or promotion. Id. at 797. 
35 Wells Fargo & Co. v. ABD Ins. & Fin. Servs., Inc., 758 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th 
Cir. 2014); Newcal Indus., Inc. v. Ikon Office Sol., 513 F.3d 1038, 1052 (9th Cir. 
2008); Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d 264, 272 (4th Cir. 2002); Warner-
Lambert Co. v. Breathasure, Inc., 204 F.3d 87, 91–92 (3d Cir. 2000); United Indus. 
Corp. v. Clorox Co., 140 F.3d 1175, 1180 (8th Cir. 1998); Skil Corp., 375 F. Supp at 
782–83. 
36 Given the nature of advertising and promotion, the interstate commerce 
requirement is rarely invoked in a Lanham Act defense and is even less likely to 
succeed. It has long been acknowledged that the Lanham Act “confers broad 
jurisdictional powers upon the courts of the United States.” Steele v. Bulova Watch 
Co., 344 U.S. 280, 283 (1952); see also U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 898 F.2d at 922 (“The 
commerce requirement has been broadly interpreted.”). There are, however, certain 
instances where the interstate commerce requirement is not met, such as where the 
advertising or promotion is solely of a local variety. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Bell Atl., 
No. 99 Civ. 2889 (DC), 2000 WL 1459834, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2000) (“[A]ll of 
the factual allegations suggest the statements were made exclusively in Rockland 
County—that they were ‘purely local.’ The complaint alleges that the wrongful acts 
occurred within the Southern District of New York, that the yellow pages in question 
were compiled and published for Rockland County, that the directories were 
distributed ‘county wide’ in Rockland County, and that Donnelley was the ‘exclusive’ 
agent for soliciting advertisements in Rockland County. There is nothing to suggest, 
and plaintiffs do not allege, that the purported wrongful statements were made 
anywhere other than in Rockland County (and within New York State).” (citation 
omitted)); Licata & Co., Inc. v. Goldberg, 812 F. Supp. 403, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (“The 
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requirement, which requires the plaintiff to show economic or 
reputational harm directly flowing from the false advertising or 
promotion event, is likely to be met if the false advertising comes 
in the context of marketplace competition.37  As a result, this 
Article will not address these two elements in the discussion 
below. 
The elements themselves appear to have little more than a 
historical accident, originating in a 1974 district court decision.38  
That decision, which did not conduct a formal analysis of the 
named false advertising elements, cited as its only authority a 
1956 law review article that had formulated the elements based 
solely on pre-Lanham Act case law.39 
1. False or Misleading Statement of Fact
As an initial matter, it is unquestionable that a literally false
statement made in commercial speech is grounds for a Lanham 
Act claim.  If a statement is actually false, relief can be granted 
on the court’s own findings without reference to the reaction of 
the buyer or consumer of the product.40  Establishing the truth of 
a scientific question can be a difficult analysis.  Section 43(a) 
Lanham Act’s reach, while long, does not extend to the full outer limits of the 
commerce power.”). 
37 The plaintiff must show economic or reputational injury flowing directly from 
the deception wrought by the defendant’s advertising, “and that occurs when 
deception of consumers causes them to withhold trade from the plaintiff.” Lexmark 
Int’l, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 1391. Moreover, courts have been cognizant that reputational 
harm resulting from the sale of falsely labeled products is difficult to prove, and an 
erosion of consumer confidence in a product can take time to fully develop. See 
Camel Hair & Cashmere Inst. of Am., Inc. v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 799 F.2d 
6, 13 (1st Cir. 1986). Still, there are some limits to the ability to prove injury, such as 
where a court rejected a Lanham Act claim where the plaintiff presented “nothing 
beyond mere conjecture with regard to the anticipated harm to [its] reputation. And, 
significantly, [Plaintiff] has experienced an increase in sales since the industry 
became aware of Defendants’ mistake.” Riverdale Mills Corp. v. Cavatorta N. Am., 
Inc., 146 F. Supp. 3d 356, 362 (D. Mass. 2015) (rejecting a Lanham Act claim 
regarding the composition of lobster fishing nets where alleged false statements 
occurred for an isolated period of time, Defendant ceased selling of the alleged 
mislabeled product, Defendant took steps to inform customers of labeling product, 
Defendant took steps to inform customers of labeling issue, and where Plaintiff’s 
sale actually increased in the period in question). 
38 See Skil Corp., 375 F. Supp. at 782–83. 
39 See id. at 783 (citing Gilbert H. Weil, Protectability of Trademark Values 
Against False Competitive Advertising, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 527, 537 (1956)). 
40 Am. Brands, Inc. v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 413 F. Supp. 1352, 1357 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
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cases often require judges and juries to make factual 
determinations on technical, scientific, or medical issues in which 
they have little background or expertise.41 
Misleading statements are equally actionable.  The vast 
majority of false advertising cases have recognized that even 
statements that are “literally” true can similarly mislead 
consumers and are therefore actionable under § 43(a).42  As one 
court explained, if false advertising law merely prohibited literal 
falsehoods, “clever use of innuendo, indirect intimations, and 
ambiguous suggestions could shield the advertisement from 
scrutiny precisely when protection against such sophisticated 
deception is most needed.”43 
As the Lanham Act makes actionable any false or misleading 
statement of fact, a statement of opinion is not actionable.44  
Congress added the words “of fact” to the original version of the 
section in the 1988 amendments to avoid a First Amendment 
constitutional challenge.45  Though the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized that “the line between 
41 See, e.g., C.B. Fleet Co., Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, 
L.P., 131 F.3d 430, 437 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that the district court conducted a
three-day trial focused largely on expert testimony related to scientific tests);
Castrol Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 799 F. Supp. 424, 427 (D.N.J. 1992) (deciding claims
regarding motor oil’s effect on viscosity breakdown and engine wear), aff’d, 987 F.2d
939 (3d Cir. 1993); McNeil-P.P.C., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., Inc., 755 F.
Supp. 1206, 1217–18 (S.D.N.Y 1990) (basing decision on medical studies), aff’d, 938
F.2d 1544 (2d Cir. 1991); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s Inc., 588 F.
Supp. 1082, 1093–94 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (describing seven days of testimony from more
than a dozen expert witnesses, including statisticians, dermatologists, chemists, and
physicists, noting that “much of their testimony was incomprehensible”), aff’d, 747
F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1984).
42 Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal Trademark and
False Advertising Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1305, 1320 (2011). 
43 Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 
1978). 
44 See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990) (“[A] 
statement of opinion relating to matters of public concern which does not contain a 
provably false factual connotation will receive full constitutional protection.”); 
Eastman Chem. Co. v. PlastiPure, Inc., 775 F.3d 230, 234 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Essential 
to any claim under [§] 43(a) of the Lanham Act is a determination of whether the 
challenged statement is one of fact—actionable under [§] 43(a)—or one of general 
opinion—not actionable under [§] 43(a).” (quoting Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John’s 
Int’l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 495–96 (5th Cir. 2000))); Groden v. Random House, Inc., 61 
F.3d 1045, 1051 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[S]tatements of opinion are generally not the basis
for Lanham Act liability.”).
45 134 CONG. REC. H10420 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988) (statement of Rep. 
Kastenmeier). 
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fact and opinion is not always a clear one,”46 a fact is one that can 
be proven through some verification or establishment of 
certainty.47 
“A plaintiff can succeed on a false advertising claim by 
proving either that the defendant’s advertisement is literally 
false or implicitly false—that is, the advertisement is true or 
ambiguous yet misleading.”48  Where the advertisement is 
literally false, a violation may be established without evidence of 
consumer deception.49  Where the advertisement is implicitly 
false, however, “an additional burden is placed upon the plaintiff 
to show that the advertisement . . . conveys a misleading 
message to the viewing public.”50 
Different burdens of proof exist depending upon whether the 
suit seeks injunctive relief or monetary damages under the 
Lanham Act.51  Showing that the defendant’s activities are likely 
to cause confusion or to deceive customers is sufficient to warrant 
injunctive relief, but a plaintiff seeking monetary damages must 
show actual harm to its business.52 
2. Has the Tendency To Deceive—a Likelihood of Confusion
Standard by Another Name
To be actionable under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must do
more than merely demonstrate that a statement of fact used in 
advertising or promotion is false or misleading.  In addition, the 
Lanham Act requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that the alleged 
misrepresentation deceived a substantial portion of the 
46 ONY, Inc. v. Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc., 720 F.3d 490, 496 (2d Cir. 2013). 
47 Eastman Chem. Co., 775 F.3d at 235 (“[T]he challenged statement must make 
a ‘specific and measurable claim, capable of being proved false or of being reasonably 
interpreted as a statement of objective fact.’ ” (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Pizza Hut, Inc., 227 F.3d at 496)); Presidio Enters, Inc. v. Warner Bros. 
Distrib. Corp., 784 F.2d 674, 679 (5th Cir. 1986) (defining a statement of fact as “one 
that (1) admits of being adjudged true or false in a way that (2) admits of empirical 
verification”). 
48 Cashmere & Camel Hair Mfrs. Inst. v. Saks Fifth Ave., 284 F.3d 302, 311 (2d 
Cir. 2002). 
49 Balance Dynamics Corp. v. Schmitt Indus., Inc., 204 F.3d 683, 693 (6th Cir. 
2000) (noting that “when a statement is literally false, a plaintiff need not 
demonstrate actual customer deception in order to obtain relief”). 
50 Clorox Co. P.R. v. Proctor & Gamble Commercial Co., 228 F.3d 24, 33 (1st Cir. 
2000). 
51 Cashmere & Camel Hair Mfrs. Inst., 284 F.3d at 311. 
52 Quabaug Rubber Co. v. Fabiano Shoe Co., 567 F.2d 154, 160–61 (1st Cir. 
1977). 
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consuming public.53  Plaintiffs whose claims allege that a 
statement is literally false do not need to prove consumer 
deception.54  Literally false advertisements are presumptively 
deceptive,55 and courts will presume that consumer confusion 
existed.56 
When evaluating whether an advertising claim is literally 
false, the claim must always be analyzed in its full context.57  
Consequently, a claim can be literally false “by necessary 
53 See Wells Fargo & Co. v. ABD Ins. & Fin. Servs., Inc., 758 F.3d 1069, 1071 
(9th Cir. 2014); Clorox Co. P.R., 228 F.3d at 33 n.6; Johnson & Johnson-Merck 
Consumer Pharm. Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., Inc., 19 F.3d 125, 129 (3d 
Cir. 1994); Pfizer, Inc. v. Miles, Inc., 868 F. Supp. 437, 442 (D. Conn. 1994) (“The 
[Lanham Act] embraces false impressions, innuendo and ambiguous suggestions.”). 
54 See B. Sanfield, Inc. v. Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp., 168 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 
1999) (“Where the statement in question is actually false, then the plaintiff need not 
show that the statement either actually deceived consumers or was likely to do so.”); 
Castrol Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d 939, 943 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[A] plaintiff must 
prove either literal falsity or consumer confusion, but not both.” (emphases 
omitted)); Johnson & Johnson v. GAC Int’l, Inc., 862 F.2d 975, 977 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(“When a . . . representation is literally or explicitly false, the court may grant relief 
without reference to the advertisement’s impact on the buying public.” (quoting 
Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana Prods., Inc., 690 F.2d 312, 317 (2d Cir. 1982))). 
55 See Balance Dynamics Corp. v. Schmitt Indus., Inc., 204 F.3d 683, 693 (6th 
Cir. 2000) (“Because proof of ‘actual confusion’ can be difficult to obtain, most of the 
circuits have rules that when a statement is literally false, a plaintiff need not 
demonstrate actual customer deception in order to obtain relief under the Lanham 
Act.” (citation omitted)). 
56 See, e.g., Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Papa John’s Int’l, Inc., 227 F.3d 489, 497 (5th Cir. 
2000) (“[W]hen the statements of fact at issue are shown to be literally false, the 
plaintiff need not introduce evidence on the issue of the impact the statements had 
on consumers.”); Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 110 F.3d 1329, 1334–35, 1337 
(8th Cir. 1997) (determining that proof of consumer confusion was unnecessary 
where a jury determines that a defendant advertised in bad faith); William H. 
Morris Co. v. Group W, Inc., 66 F.3d 255, 258 (9th Cir. 1995) (“If [defendant] 
intentionally misled consumers, we presume consumers were in fact deceived . . . .”); 
Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm. Co., 19 F.3d at 131 (presuming 
consumer injury where plaintiff proves intent to deceive and egregious conduct); 
Coca-Cola Co., 690 F.2d at 317 (“When a merchandising statement or representation 
is literally or explicitly false, the court may grant relief without reference to the 
advertisement’s impact on the buying public.”); Am. Brands, Inc. v. R. J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co., 413 F. Supp. 1352, 1356 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (“[A] court can grant relief on 
its own findings without recourse to a survey of consumer reaction.”). 
57 Castrol Inc., 987 F.2d at 946; Am. Home Prod. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 
687 (3d Cir. 1982); Cuisinarts, Inc. v. Robot-Coupe Int’l Corp., No. 81 Civ 731-CSH, 
1982 WL 121559, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 1982) (“[I]n determining facial falsity the 
court must view the face of the statement in its entirety, rather than examining the 
eyes, nose, and mouth separately and in isolation from each other.”). 
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implication.”58  Still, to prove that an advertising claim based on 
product testing is literally false, “a plaintiff must do more than 
show that the tests supporting the challenged claim are 
unpersuasive.”59  Additionally, the plaintiff must demonstrate 
that such tests are not sufficiently reliable to permit one to 
conclude with reasonable certainty that the tests established the 
claim made.60  To meet such a standard, a plaintiff may attack 
the validity of the defendant’s tests directly or use other scientific 
testing to show that the defendant’s tests are contradicted or 
unsupported.61  Moreover, if the plaintiff can show that the tests, 
even if reliable, do not establish the proposition asserted by the 
defendant, the plaintiff has obviously met its burden of 
demonstrating literal falsity.62 
In the absence of the allegation of a literal falsity, the 
plaintiff must show that the advertisement, though explicitly 
true, nonetheless conveys a misleading message to the viewing 
public.63  To satisfy its burden, the plaintiff must show how 
consumers have actually reacted to the challenged advertisement 
rather than merely demonstrating how they could have reacted.64 
58 Castrol Inc., 987 F.2d at 946; Tambrands, Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co., 673 F. 
Supp. 1190, 1193–94 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
59 McNeil-P.C.C., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 938 F.2d 1544, 1549 (2d Cir. 
1991); see also Procter & Gamble Co. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s, Inc., 747 F.2d 114, 119 
(2d Cir. 1984). 
60 McNeil-P.C.C., Inc., 938 F.2d at 1549; Procter & Gamble Co., 747 F.2d at 119. 
61 Castrol, Inc., 977 F.2d at 62–63 (distinguishing product superiority claim not 
based on testing, which must be proven false by affirmative evidence, from product 
superiority claim explicitly or implicitly based on tests or studies, which may be 
proven false by showing that the tests did not establish the proposition for which 
they were cited). 
62 Id. at 63. 
63 See United Indus. Corp. v. Clorox Co., 140 F.3d 1175, 1183 (8th Cir. 1998) 
(stating that when there is no finding of a willful violation or an intent to deceive, 
evidence of consumer impact is essential—usually through consumer or market 
research—unless the commercial claim is literally false); Sandoz Pharm. Corp. v. 
Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 F.2d 222, 228 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[A] Lanham Act plaintiff 
must prove deceptiveness in court.”). 
64 See Cottrell, Ltd. v. Biotrol Int’l, Inc., 191 F.3d 1248, 1256 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that if the plaintiff can establish by consumer surveys or other means that 
the defendant’s advertising is likely to confuse or actually confuses consumers, any 
false implication is as damaging for a Lanham Act claim as an express false claim); 
Johnson & Johnson * Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 
960 F.2d 294, 298 (2d Cir. 1992) (requiring plaintiff to demonstrate that a 
“statistically significant part of the commercial audience holds the false belief 
allegedly communicated by the challenged advertisement”); Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 
902 F.2d at 228–29 (“[Where an advertising statement is not literally false, the] 
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Consumer deception is often demonstrated through surveys 
that establish that consumers were misled by the alleged 
misrepresentations.65  For example, in a suit involving the 
naming, labeling, and advertising of a competitor’s juice product, 
the plaintiff claimed that the defendant’s product misled 
consumers regarding the quantity of pomegranate in its juices.66  
To support its claim, the plaintiff offered a field survey that 
showed a thirty-five percent differential between the test and 
control groups who mistakenly believed that the defendant’s 
product mainly contained pomegranate and blueberry juice, 
rather than a fruit juice blend where pomegranate and blueberry 
are the third and fourth most used juices.67  Though the 
defendant challenged the plaintiff’s survey methodology and 
applicability, the district court determined that consumer 
deception was a disputed question of fact, and, consequently, the 
court denied summary judgment.68  In cases involving alleged 
consumer confusion, the court has generally set a fairly low 
threshold bar for consumer deception demonstrated through 
surveys in order for a claim to proceed.69 
plaintiff bears the burden of proving actual deception by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Hence, it cannot obtain relief by arguing how consumers could react; it 
must show how consumers actually do react.”). 
65 See Johnson & Johnson v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 631 F.2d 186, 191 (2d Cir. 
1980) (claiming consumers were misled by defendant’s ad that claimed its product 
contained baby oil through introducing surveys that indicated that some people, 
after viewing defendant’s ads, thought they would not have to use baby oil if they 
used defendant’s product); see also Johnson & Johnson * Merck, 960 F.2d at 298; U-
Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1238, 1249–50 (D. Ariz. 1981). 
66 POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca Cola Co., 727 F. Supp. 2d 849, 856 (C.D. Cal. 
2010), aff'd in part, vacated in part, remanded sub nom. Pom Wonderful LLC v. 
Coca-Cola Co., 679 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014). 
67 Id. at 857–58. 
68 Id. at 875–76 (holding that, though the district court recognized questions 
regarding the reliability of the survey, “whether the Field Survey actually meets the 
Daubert standards is best considered at trial”). 
69 Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer 
Pharm. Co., 290 F.3d 578, 594 (3d Cir. 2002) (finding that 15.5% would be sufficient 
to support a finding of substantial consumer confusion); Coca-Cola Co. v. Tropicana 
Prods., Inc., 690 F.2d 312, 317 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that a consumer survey that 
demonstrated 7.5% consumer deception constituted “a significant number of 
consumers . . . likely to be misled”). 
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3. Materiality
The materiality prong requires the plaintiff to demonstrate
that the other party’s falsities or misrepresentations were “likely 
to influence the purchasing decision” of consumers,70 though 
some commentators argue that, in practice, the materiality 
analysis merges with the second prong regarding an 
advertisement’s tendency to deceive.71  The materiality 
requirement recognizes that not all alleged deceptions affect 
consumer purchasing decisions,72 thereby allowing courts to 
implement a common-sense approach to the materiality 
70 Aristotle Int’l, Inc. v. NGP Software, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2010) 
(quoting Cashmere & Camel Hair Mfrs. Inst. v. Saks Fifth Ave., 284 F.3d 302, 311 
(1st Cir. 2002)); see also 3M Innovative Prop. Co. v. Dupont Dow Elastomers LLC, 
361 F. Supp. 2d 958, 971 (D. Minn. 2005) (“Materiality . . . considers whether the 
false or misleading statement is likely to make a difference to purchasers.” (internal 
quotation mark omitted) (quoting Cashmere & Camel Hair Mfrs. Inst., 284 F.3d at 
312 n.10)); Am. Brands, Inc. v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 413 F. Supp. 1352, 1357 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (“[W]e are asked to determine whether a statement acknowledged to 
be literally true and grammatically correct nevertheless has a tendency to mislead, 
confuse or deceive. As to such a proposition the public’s reaction to (the) 
advertisement will be the starting point in any discussion of the likelihood of 
deception.” (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting 1 RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE 
LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES § 19.2(a)(1) (3d ed. 
1967))). 
71 For example, some commentators contend that the second and third elements 
merge in a practical Lanham Act legal analysis so that the “materiality” element 
only requires deception or the capacity to deceive. Given that the language of § 43(a) 
does not speak of “materiality” per se, the elements often combine to be a false or 
material statement that is material in that it deceives or is likely to deceive. 
Moreover, although courts require a showing of “likely effect on consumer decisions,” 
this is in connection with the fifth element, proving the fact or threat of injury to a 
claimant. See Courtland L. Reichman & M. Melissa Cannady, False Advertising 
Under the Lanham Act, 21 FRANCHISE L.J. 187, 187–88 (2002) (noting the merging 
of elements in many Lanham Act analyses). 
72 William H. Morris Co. v. Grp. W, Inc., 66 F.3d 255, 258 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(holding that a letter from the distributor of a dietary supplement did not affect 
purchasing decisions because only three percent of pharmacists interviewed 
interpreted the letter as referring to plaintiff’s product); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. 
Blue Cross, 898 F.2d 914, 922 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that misrepresentations in an 
advertisement must “influence the purchasing decision” of the buying public to 
satisfy the materiality requirement). 
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analysis.73  For example, the materiality requirement allows the 
court to accept certain advertising campaigns as puffery if the 
claims are sufficiently vague to prevent consumer confusion.74 
As one scholar has argued, on a practical basis, the 
materiality test also serves an effective gatekeeping function for 
the courts.75  Materiality is a mixed question of law and fact,76 
and as a result, a court can dismiss a case on the pleadings or on 
summary judgment if the plaintiff fails to make a sufficient 
showing.77  Still, materiality is not a particularly significant 
burden for plaintiffs; evidence of materiality can come through 
consumer surveys that are already employed in standard false 
advertising litigation.78  Alternatively, where a survey question is 
so distant from the questions a consumer is likely to ask in a 
73 Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Sports Team Analysis & Tracking Sys., Inc., 939 F. 
Supp. 1071, 1110 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd in part, vacated in part sub nom. Nat’l 
Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The insignificance of 
the statement ‘from the arena’ is illustrated further by omitting it entirely from the 
clause in which it is found. If the clause simply stated, ‘Nationwide game updates,’ I 
find it difficult to envision (and NBA has not shown otherwise) that consumers 
suddenly would reassess their decisions to purchase SportsTrax.”). 
74 Tushnet, supra note 42, at 1344–45 (“Materiality, among other concepts, 
allows courts to bless certain ad claims on their face as nonactionable 
puffery. . . . [I]t is the law that consumers are irrebuttably presumed not to rely on 
sufficiently vague or exaggerated claims.”). 
75 Burns, supra note 16, at 882. 
76 See, e.g., Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 105 F.3d at 855 (holding that even if claim is 
literally false, plaintiff must still show materiality); Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback 
& Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1428 n.9 (3d Cir. 1994) (plaintiff alleging 
false advertising must prove “that the deception is material in that it is likely to 
influence purchasing decisions”); ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 
F.2d 958, 964 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (false or misleading ads must be “material in their
effects on buying decisions”); Taquino v. Teledyne Monarch Rubber, 893 F.2d 1488,
1500 (5th Cir. 1990) (deception must be “material, in that it is likely to influence the
purchasing decision”); Tire Kingdom, Inc. v. Morgan Tire & Auto, Inc., 915 F. Supp.
360, 366 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (granting summary judgment on claim because, even if
false, the representation was not material); Compaq Comput. Corp. v. Procom Tech.,
Inc., 908 F. Supp. 1409, 1426–27 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (dismissing claim based on
technically false picture that was found to have little chance of misleading
customers).
77 See Burns, supra note 16, at 882 (arguing that the materiality element allows 
the court to function as a gatekeeper to spurious false advertising claims). 
78 See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson * Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. Smithkline 
Beecham Corp., 960 F.2d 294, 298 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating consumer surveys may be 
used to establish consumer confusion); Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol–Myers Co., 661 
F.2d 272, 275–76 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating consumer preference studies were used to
prove consumer confusion). But see Tushnet, supra note 42, at 1347 (“Materiality
can also be used more indirectly to evaluate the relevance of survey evidence that
allegedly shows a likelihood of consumer confusion.”).
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marketplace context, courts may determine that the value of 
questions renders the survey unreliable.79  Given a general trust 
of science, the materiality prong is particularly likely to be met 
where there are claims of scientific validity to support the 
promotion.  Consumers are likely to perceive as true such claims 
that appear to be based upon scientific evidence.80 
These elements—(1) a false or misleading statement of fact, 
(2) with a tendency to deceive, and that (3) materially affects a
consumer purchasing decision—constitute the key elements
required for a traditional analysis of a false advertising claim.
As the next Part demonstrates, determining what constitutes
commercial speech falling under the purview of the Lanham Act
can be a challenging endeavor.  Such analysis is particularly
complicated when the speech in question involves scientific
inquiry that is protected by the First Amendment.
II. ONY’S POTENTIAL CHILLING EFFECT ON LANHAM ACT
LITIGATION 
Taken to its logical conclusion, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit’s ONY decision has the potential 
to foreclose adjudication of false advertising disputes in 
industries where marketing relies heavily upon scientific 
validation.  As discussed below, the publication of scientific 
research is protected First Amendment speech, and courts have 
often been cautious to allow the regulation of commercial speech 
to intrude upon the protection of First Amendment speech rights. 
The ONY decision, which would allow commercial entities to 
adopt and distribute the language of academic publications 
without regulation under the Lanham Act, is a step too far. 
Under ONY, a commercial entity could immune itself from a 
Lanham Act claim by creating marketing based upon scientific 
articles in academic publications without regard to the veracity 
of the scientific findings upon which the marketing is based. 
79 See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Kimberly–Clark Corp., 569 F. Supp. 2d 796, 
804–05 (E.D. Wis. 2008) (finding that a survey asking which of the parties’ diapers 
had a more “natural fit” posed an epistemological question that survey evidence 
could not satisfactorily answer). 
80 See POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca Cola Co., 727 F. Supp. 2d 849, 857–58 (C.D. 
Cal. 2010) (consumers are likely to perceive certain types of claims, such as health 
and nutrition claims, as being based upon scientific evidence), aff’d in part, vacated 
in part, remanded sub nom. POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 679 F.3d 1170 
(9th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014). 
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A. Scientific Journals, the Lanham Act, and the First
Amendment
The Lanham Act only prohibits false “commercial
advertising or promotion,” namely commercial speech81  The core 
notion of commercial speech, as defined by the United States 
Supreme Court, is “speech which does no more than propose a 
commercial transaction.”82  Under its broadest definition, 
commercial speech is an “expression related solely to the 
economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”83 
The definition of advertising and promotion under the 
Lanham Act extends beyond traditional advertising campaigns, 
however.84  For example, § 43(a) has been found applicable to the 
fundraising letters of a nonprofit pregnancy counseling group,85 
to the distribution of marketing information to retailers at a 
trade show,86 and has even been found to extend to an 
individual’s “badmouthing” of her former employer in telephone 
calls made to colleagues and friends.87  In effect, the standard has 
become that while the false representations need not be made in 
a classic advertising campaign, the representation must be in the 
context of commercial speech, the representation must be made 
for the purposes of consumers to purchase goods or services, and 
81 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
82 See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 422 (1993) 
(quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983)); see also Bolger, 
463 U.S. at 68 (holding that informational pamphlets addressing “important public 
issues[,] such as venereal disease and family planning,” constituted commercial 
speech where communications were conceded to be advertisements in that they 
referred to specific products sold by the defendant, and that the defendant had an 
economic motivation for the speech). 
83 City of Cincinnati, 507 U.S. at 422. 
84 Gordon & Breach Sci. Publishers S.A. v. Am. Inst. of Physics, 859 F. Supp. 
1521, 1534–35 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
85 Birthright v. Birthright, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 1114, 1138 (D.N.J. 1993). 
86 Am. Needle & Novelty, Inc. v. Drew Pearson Mktg., Inc., 820 F. Supp. 1072, 
1078 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (recognizing that “[t]he level of circulation required to 
constitute advertising and promotion will undeniably vary from industry to industry 
and from case to case”). 
87 Nat’l Artists Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Weaving, 769 F. Supp. 1224, 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991) (“It is true that defendants’ conduct—speaking by telephone with a number of 
friends, acquaintances, and colleagues about the reasons for terminating their 
relationships with [the company]—is not ‘commercial advertising and promotion’ in 
the traditional sense of large-scale, nationwide commercial advertising campaigns. 
In the context of the theatre-booking industry, however, ‘services’ are ‘promoted’ by 
word-of-mouth and information is spread through a network of telephone contacts 
with producers, promoters, and presenters.”). 
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the representation must be disseminated sufficiently to the 
relevant purchasing public to constitute “advertising” or 
“promotion” within that industry.88 
B. Scientific Articles as Protected Speech
Given that the Lanham Act has the potential to chill First
Amendment speech rights, courts have been somewhat reluctant 
to extend the reach of the Lanham Act into areas that may 
intrude upon the First Amendment.89  Academic research is one 
such area.  For example, the Supreme Court has determined that 
academic freedom, including academic scientific research, 
constitutes a “special concern of the First Amendment.”90 
The First Amendment protects “scientific speech.”91  
Consequently, a debate that takes place in academic journals is 
part of the marketplace of ideas protected by the First 
Amendment.92  As a result, the publication of an article 
addressing scientific findings in a peer-reviewed journal does not 
constitute commercial speech, even if there is the potential for 
erroneous content.93 
In addition to “pure” science articles, there is the publication 
of an article that appears to serve dual masters.  From one 
perspective, this article can be speech that is noncommercial in 
nature and addresses a significant public issue, thereby 
88 Gordon & Breach Sci. Publishers S.A., 859 F. Supp. at 1535–36. 
89 Boule v. Hutton, 328 F.3d 84, 91 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting the general approach 
of being “careful not to permit overextension of the Lanham Act to intrude on First 
Amendment values” (quoting Groden v. Random House, Inc., 61 F.3d 1045, 1052 (2d 
Cir. 1995))). 
90 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). 
91 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973) (“The First Amendment protects 
works which, taken as a whole, have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific 
value, regardless of whether the government or a majority of the people approve of 
the ideas these works represent.”); Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. 
Sullivan, 773 F. Supp. 472, 474 (D.D.C. 1991) (“It is equally settled, however, though 
less commonly the subject of litigation, that the First Amendment protects scientific 
expression and debate just as it protects political and artistic expression.”). 
92 Gordon & Breach Sci. Publishers S.A., 859 F. Supp. at 1541 (citing Keyishian, 
385 U.S. at 603). 
93 See, e.g., Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Amersham Health, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d 
384, 456 (D.N.J. 2009) (“[T]here is an abundance of case law to support the 
proposition that a scientific article is protected noncommercial speech despite the 
potential for erroneous content.”); Sullivan, 773 F. Supp. at 474 (“It is equally 
settled, however, though less commonly the subject of litigation, that the First 
Amendment protects scientific expression and debate just as it protects political and 
artistic expression.”). 
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constituting protected speech under the First Amendment.94  
From another perspective, however, such speech appears to 
propose a commercial transaction that would be regulated under 
the Lanham Act.95 
Although the context was informational pamphlets rather 
than academic articles, the Supreme Court examined the nature 
of intertwined “commercial” and “noncommercial” speech in 
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.96  In Bolger, the Court 
examined the application of a federal statute that prohibited the 
mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives.97  
Youngs, a pharmaceuticals wholesaler, sought to undertake a 
campaign of unsolicited mass mailings promoting its products, 
including contraceptives, to the general public.98  The majority of 
Youngs’s mailings consisted primarily of price and quantity 
information, and these mailings fell within the core notion of 
commercial speech.99  Other mailings, however, were less 
explicitly commercial: these mailings consisted of informational 
pamphlets with titles such as “Condoms and Human Sexuality” 
and “Plain Talk about Venereal Disease.”100  The pamphlets 
included references, of varying degrees of prominence, to Youngs 
and its Trojan-brand condoms.101  The Supreme Court 
acknowledged that a mere economic motivation for the mailing is 
insufficient to render the materials commercial speech.102  The 
same is true for a simple reference to a commercial product.103  
Though the Court recognized the commercial speech issue to be a 
close question, it concluded that “[t]he combination of all these 
94 Gordon & Breach Sci. Publishers S.A., 859 F. Supp. at 1539 (presenting, 
“from one perspective . . . the aspect of protected, noncommercial speech addressing 
a significant public issue, but which, from another perspective, appears primarily to 
be speech ‘proposing a commercial transaction.’ ”). 
95 Id. 
96 463 U.S. 60 (1983). 
97 Id. at 61–62. 
98 Id. at 62. 
99 Id. at 66. 
100 Id. at 62 n.4. 
101 Id. (noting that for pamphlets regarding venereal disease, “[t]he only 
identification of Youngs or its products [was] at the bottom of the last page of the 
pamphlet, which state[d] that the pamphlet ha[d] been contributed as a public 
service by Youngs, the distributor of Trojan-brand prophylactics”). 
102 Id. at 66–67. 
103 Id. 
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characteristics . . . provides strong support for the . . . conclusion 
that the informational pamphlets are properly characterized as 
commercial speech.”104 
Courts applying this mixed commercial-noncommercial 
analysis to academic works have generally found their 
publication to be noncommercial and, therefore, outside the reach 
of the Lanham Act.105  For example, the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York found that an article 
containing comparative surveys of scientific journals that rated 
its own publications as superior did not constitute commercial 
speech.106  The nonprofit publisher’s potential financial benefit 
was not outcome determinative.107  Similarly, the author of the 
book The Cure for All Cancers suggested that readers refrain 
from ingesting a manufacturer’s vitamins because the vitamins 
contained an ingredient that was allegedly carcinogenic.108  The 
court held that allegedly false statements about the vitamin did 
not constitute commercial speech because “the commercial 
elements of the speech [were] intertwined with the central 
message” that was noncommercial in nature.109  Additionally, a 
nonprofit medical association’s publication of an article that 
contained allegedly false statements about the defendant’s 
electrodiagnostic medical devices did not constitute commercial 
speech because the authors of the article did not advocate for a 
commercial transaction.110  Even if some of the language in the 
article was commercial in nature, the article’s public significance 
and status as an academic piece published by a nonprofit 
organization meant it was noncommercial speech.111 
104 Id. at 67. 
105 Gordon & Breach Sci. Publishers S.A., v. Am. Inst. Of Physics, 859 F. Supp. 
1521, 1541, 1545 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
106 Id. at 1523, 1545. 
107 Id. at 1541 (“The fact that AIP and APS stood to benefit from publishing 
Barschall’s results—even that they intended to benefit—is insufficient by itself to 
turn the articles into commercial speech.”). 
108 Oxycal Labs., Inc. v. Jeffers, 909 F. Supp. 719, 720 (S.D. Cal. 1995). 
109 Id. at 725. 
110 Neurotron, Inc. v. Am. Ass’n of Electrodiagnostic Med., 189 F. Supp. 2d 271, 
277 (D. Md. 2001) (“The Technology Review is published by AAEM, a non-profit 
organization, whose purpose is not only to lobby and advocate for its members, but 
also to provide educational services such as informing members of current trends in 
the industry through publications such as Muscle & Nerve, or by conducting 
educational seminars. None of these activities are commercial in nature.”). 
111 Id. 
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Still, the publication of an article may constitute commercial 
speech if the statements in the article were made for an explicitly 
commercial purpose.  For example, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that the publication of 
an article in a trade-based journal fell under the ambit of the 
Lanham Act because the article contained demonstrably false 
information about a product that was likely to influence a 
purchasing decision.112  Here, a trade journal asked the president 
of a manufacturer of beryllium-copper plunger tips to write an 
article about the manufacture of plunger tips.113  The article 
submitted by the company president contained a number of self-
serving statements about his company’s products.114  The journal, 
after removing some of the most self-serving comments, 
published the article.115  After the article’s publication, the 
defendant-manufacturer obtained reprints, made numerous 
copies, and used the article as a promotional brochure at trade 
shows.116  A competitor filed suit, arguing that the article itself 
amounted to false advertising or promotion and violated the 
Lanham Act.117  The Sixth Circuit agreed, holding that the article 
in the trade publication constituted commercial speech, and that 
any false statements would be actionable under the Lanham 
Act.118 
C. Scientific Statements in Academic Publications: Statements
of Fact or Opinion?
In ONY, the Second Circuit held that a pharmaceutical
manufacturer’s dissemination of an academic article and the 
company’s press release quoting those scientific findings did not 
constitute commercial speech.119  Because the Lanham Act only 
prohibits false or misleading statements of fact, statements of 
112 Semco, Inc. v. Amcast, Inc., 52 F.3d 108, 113–14 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that 
an article was commercial speech under the Lanham Act where the publication 
author “presented an article peppered with advertising for Amcast—and that 
advertising, which the trade publication did not solicit, allegedly contained material 
misrepresentations of Amcast products”). 
113 Id. at 110. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 111. 
117 Id. at 110. 
118 Id. at 114. 
119 ONY, Inc. v. Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc., 720 F.3d 490, 492 (2d Cir. 
2013). 
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opinion are outside the bounds of traditional Lanham Act 
analysis.120  The Second Circuit’s ONY analysis determined that 
scientific discourse constitutes opinion, thereby finding that 
scientific discourse falls outside the scope of Lanham Act 
regulation.121  Still, the Second Circuit recognized that scientific 
academic discourse poses a peculiar problem in the fact-opinion 
paradigm.122  Facts are statements that can be verified,123 and the 
very nature of scientific publication is to establish facts that hold 
up to rigorous research and testing.124  Moreover, most 
conclusions in scientific journal articles are “capable of 
verification or refutation by means of objective proof.”125  While 
these scientific conclusions are subject to proof, the Second 
Circuit has argued that the essence of the scientific method is 
marked by tentative conclusions.126  A key point in the Second 
Circuit’s ONY analysis is that these scientific statements are 
made for the scientific community and not for the general 
public.127  As the Second Circuit explained, “These conclusions 
are then available to other scientists who may respond by 
attempting to replicate the described experiments, conducting 
their own experiments, or analyzing or refuting the soundness of 
the experimental design or the validity of the inferences drawn 
from the results.”128  Therefore, although the matters presented 
120 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012). 
121 ONY, Inc., 720 F.3d at 497–98. 
122 Id. at 496–97. 
123 Presidio Enters., Inc. v. Warner Bros. Distrib. Corp., 784 F.2d 674, 679 (5th 
Cir. 1986) (“A statement of fact is one that (1) admits of being adjudged true or false 
in a way that (2) admits of empirical verification.”). 
124 ONY, Inc., 720 F.3d at 496 (“Indeed, it is the very premise of the scientific 
enterprise that it engages with empirically verifiable facts about the universe.”). 
125 Phantom Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated Publ’ns, 953 F.2d 724, 728 n.7 (1st Cir. 
1992). 
126 ONY, Inc., 720 F.3d at 496 (“[I]t is the essence of the scientific method that 
the conclusions of empirical research are tentative and subject to revision, because 
they represent inferences about the nature of reality based on the results of 
experimentation and observation.”). 
127 Id. at 496–97 (“Importantly, those conclusions are presented in publications 
directed to the relevant scientific community, ideally in peer-reviewed academic 
journals that warrant that research approved for publication demonstrates at least 
some degree of basic scientific competence.”). 
128 Id. at 497. 
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within scientific journal articles might be verifiable, the Second 
Circuit determined that information offered in scientific journals 
is more akin to opinion.129 
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit’s Eastman decision offers a 
more balanced approach.  As that court made clear, “it is of no 
moment that the commercial speech in this case concerned a 
topic of scientific debate.  Advertisements do not become immune 
from Lanham Act scrutiny simply because their claims are open 
to scientific or public debate.”130  As the Fifth Circuit suggested, 
the distribution of scientific literature or a scientific article for 
promotional purposes transforms that speech into commercial 
speech that may be regulated by the Lanham Act.131 
D. Distribution Transforms Noncommercial Speech into
Commercial Speech
In addition to holding that the publication of statements and
research results do not constitute facts under the Lanham Act, 
the Second Circuit in ONY determined that the subsequent 
distribution of the article was similarly not commercial speech.132  
Although the court used explicit language holding that 
distribution of the article did not trigger the Lanham Act, the 
Second Circuit’s analysis only considered whether publication of 
the article was commercial speech itself, finding that it was 
not.133  Given that it was not commercial speech, the Second 
Circuit concluded that further dissemination of the article was 
similarly inactionable.134 
129 Id. (“[W]hile statements about contested and contestable scientific 
hypotheses constitute assertions about the world that are in principle matters of 
verifiable ‘fact,’ for purposes of the First Amendment and the laws relating to fair 
competition and defamation, they are more closely akin to matters of opinion, and 
are so understood by the relevant scientific communities.”). 
130 Eastman Chem. Co. v. PlastiPure, Inc., 775 F.3d 230, 236 (5th Cir. 2014). 
131 Id. at 237. 
132 ONY, Inc., 720 F.3d at 492 (“We conclude that, as a matter of law, 
statements of scientific conclusions about unsettled matters of scientific debate 
cannot give rise to liability for damages sounding in defamation. We further 
conclude that the secondary distribution of excerpts of such an article cannot give 
rise to liability, so long as the excerpts do not mislead a reader about the conclusions 
of the article.”). 
133 Id. at 497–98 (addressing the dissemination of the article only in the context 
of tortious interference claims and dismissing those claims on the basis that 
dissemination of the article was not misleading). 
134 Id. 
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As a practical matter, ONY seems to run counter to the 
stringent requirements in place with respect to the Food and 
Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) analysis of pharmaceuticals.  The 
FDA regulates all forms of prescription drug advertising, 
including direct-to-consumer advertising, thereby ensuring that 
the advertising claims are supported by credible evidence.135  The 
FDA evaluates scientific studies and determines whether they 
support the health-related claims the manufacturer wishes to 
make for the drug.  If the FDA finds the study insufficient, the 
claim may not be legally made.  A manufacturer may not claim 
that a substance treats, cures, or diagnoses a disease without 
FDA approval.  Moreover, a pharmaceutical manufacturer cannot 
circumvent such a requirement by merely asserting that “study X 
supports” such a panacea. 
The Second Circuit’s ONY analysis has a number of 
problems.  As an initial matter, the dissemination of an article is 
a separate step from the writing and publication of one. 
Although the writing of scientific articles falls within the First 
Amendment protections for academic freedom,136 the 
dissemination of that article by a company is a separate step 
deserving additional scrutiny.137  As the Fifth Circuit noted, “The 
First Amendment ensures a robust discourse in the pages of 
academic journals, but it does not immunize false or misleading 
commercial claims.”138  Consequently, the distribution of an 
article may have commercial implications beyond the academic 
speech.139 
Second, the general distribution of a scientific article will 
extend the reach of the scientific findings beyond the small, 
specialized audience of the scientific community.  In its ONY 
decision, the Second Circuit noted that conclusions in scientific 
journals are directed to the relevant scientific community.140  
135 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(j)(1)(i)-(ii) (2017). 
136 See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). 
137 See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985) (“The 
States and the Federal Government are free to prevent the dissemination of 
commercial speech that is false, deceptive, or misleading . . . .”). 
138 Eastman Chem. Co. v. PlastiPure, Inc., 775 F.3d 230, 237 (5th Cir. 2014). 
139 Id. 
140 ONY, Inc. v. Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc., 720 F.3d 490, 496–97 (2d Cir. 
2013) (“[I]t is the essence of the scientific method that the conclusions of empirical 
research are tentative and subject to revision, because they represent inferences 
about the nature of reality based on the results of experimentation and observation. 
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While such an observation is certainly true, a company’s 
distribution of a scientific article moves the scientific findings 
from the scientific community and into the realm of the general 
public.  Moreover, because the public is the ultimate consumer of 
a medical product, any distribution of the article beyond a small 
subset of academic researchers is likely to reach members of the 
general public.141  The general public has much less knowledge 
about the science in question and likely lacks an in-depth 
understanding of the research methodology used to achieve the 
scientific results.142  Even a targeted distribution to doctors, 
health care providers, or those within the greater scientific 
community is likely to reach individuals with less ability to 
analyze the scientific methodology and weigh the studies’ 
conclusions compared to those who read the article in a 
specialized scientific journal.143 
Notably, the Second Circuit in ONY determined that a 
subsequent press release touting the scientific findings did not 
transform scientific speech into commercial speech.  As the ONY 
decision notes, “After the article’s publication, Chiesi and 
Cornerstone issued a press release touting its conclusions and 
distributed promotional materials that cited the article’s 
findings.”144  Such a holding is contrary to earlier case law. 
Importantly, those conclusions are presented in publications directed to the relevant 
scientific community . . . .”). 
141 See Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 715 n.12 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(noting the increasing prevalence of prescription medication advertisements that are 
aimed directly at influencing patient choices). 
142 For a general analysis of how the public analyzes scientific evidence, see 
Jennifer L. Mnookin, Idealizing Science and Demonizing Experts: An Intellectual 
History of Expert Evidence, 52 VILL. L. REV. 763, 767 (2007) (“Our desire to idealize 
science runs, I fear, rather deep; we do not actually want science to be muddy, 
complex, pragmatic, methodologically imperfect and messy. When the science offered 
in court is all of these things, as it so often is, we therefore tend to blame the science 
itself, rather than our own unrealistic desires.”). Similarly, writing about jurors’ 
analyses of scientific evidence, Valerie Hans notes that “jurors themselves have 
identified the task of interpreting scientific and technical evidence . . . as 
particularly challenging.” Valerie P. Hans, Judges, Juries, and Scientific Evidence, 
16 J.L. & POL’Y 19, 23 (2007). 
143 See, e.g., Genzyme Corp. v. Shire Human Genetic Therapies, Inc., 906 F. 
Supp. 2d 9, 17 (D. Mass. 2012) (“[A] pharmaceutical manufacturer’s selective 
promotion of favorable scientific information could be potentially misleading even to 
sophisticated and experienced doctors.”). 
144 ONY, Inc., 720 F.3d at 495. 
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Instead, most courts agree that a company’s accompanying 
press release or explanatory letter touting its scientific findings 
constitutes commercial speech and therefore triggers regulation 
under the Lanham Act.145  For example, the secondary 
dissemination to potential customers of a survey article from the 
New England Journal of Medicine comparing two x-ray contrast 
media in a head-to-head competition constituted commercial 
speech that could be regulated under the Lanham Act.146  As the 
Massachusetts District Court made clear, “The press release was 
not a scientific publication.”147  Given that a press release has a 
target audience beyond a specific scientific community, a 
manufacturer’s press release moves the speech out of First 
Amendment-protected scientific expression and into the realm of 
regulated commercial speech.148 
145 See United States v. Harkonen, No. C 08-00164 MHP, 2009 WL 1578712, at 
*6 (N.D. Cal. June 4, 2009) (“That the speech is a press release and not a peer-
reviewed publication, that it refers to a specific commercial product on the
market . . . and that it was unquestionably disseminated for commercial benefit (e.g.,
the first line notes [defendant]’s Nasdaq stock symbol), are allegations that take the
speech at issue outside the realm of pure science speech and move it towards the
realm of commercial speech.”).
146 See Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Amersham Health, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d 384, 
458–59 (D.N.J. 2009); see also Genzyme Corp., 906 F. Supp. 2d at 16 (“[W]hile the 
original presentation of the comparative data at the EWGGD convocation was 
protected scientific expression, its secondary dissemination in a press release by 
Shire HGT was not.”). 
147 Genzyme Corp., 906 F. Supp. 2d at 16–17 (noting, also, that “the press 
release selectively disseminated information favorable to Shire HGT’s VPRIV and 
unflattering to Cerezyme to an audience that included both physicians who prescribe 
Gaucher disease treatments and patients (e.g., those served by the National 
Gaucher Foundation) who might request a specific treatment”). 
148 Id. at 17. (noting that “the press release selectively disseminated information 
favorable to Shire HGT’s VPRIV and unflattering to Cerezyme to an audience that 
included both physicians who prescribe Gaucher disease treatments and patients 
(e.g., those served by the National Gaucher Foundation) who might request a 
specific treatment”); see also Washington Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 
51, 62–65 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding that a secondary dissemination of that research 
constitutes commercial speech if it is given a pecuniary gloss), vacated in part on 
other grounds sub nom. Washington Legal Found. v. Henney, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 
2000). In Washington Legal Foundation, the court considered whether, under the 
commercial speech doctrine, the FDA could regulate the dissemination of medical 
textbook and journal reprints and continuing medical education (“CME”) seminars 
that promote off-label uses for prescription drugs. The court concluded that selective 
and/or targeted secondary dissemination of scientific research “is properly classified 
as commercial speech.” Id. at 65. “It is beyond dispute that when considered outside 
of the context of manufacturer promotion of their drug products, CME seminars, 
peer-reviewed medical journal articles[,] and commercially-available [sic] medical 
textbooks merit the highest degree of constitutional protection.” Id. at 62. However, 
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Similarly, academic speech is not immune from the Lanham 
Act when it is further disseminated.  Nonprofit organizations are 
free to publish on any topic, even those that lead to their 
financial benefit, without fear of Lanham Act liability, but the 
same does not apply to subsequent or prior promotional uses of 
that speech.149  As the Southern District of New York explained: 
The situation is similar to that of a restaurant or movie review 
or a Consumer Reports product report.  While the restaurant 
review or product report itself constitutes exactly the type of 
“consumer or editorial comment” that “raise[s] free speech 
concerns” and which Congress explicitly intended to exclude 
from [§] 43(a)’s scope, a restaurant clearly engages in 
commercial speech when it posts the New York Times review in 
its window, and General Motors engages in commercial speech 
when it announces in a television commercial that its car was 
ranked first by Consumer Reports.  The Consumer Reports 
article, of course, does not somehow become commercial speech; 
rather, G.M.’s use of the article is commercial speech. 
Consequently, G.M. may be sued under the Lanham Act, and 
Consumer Reports’[s] testing methodology may become subject 
to judicial scrutiny to determine whether G.M. “use[d] in 
commerce” a “false or misleading representation of fact.”150 
The fact that the First Amendment protected the initial creation 
is immaterial when that creator uses the speech for a secondary 
use.151 
The distribution of a scientific article is further complicated 
because the Lanham Act is a strict liability statute, and whether 
the defendant intended to deceive consumers is immaterial to 
any legal analysis.152  If a statement or scientific finding is false 
or misleading when used in commercial speech, the defendant is 
liable.  A plaintiff does not need to show intent to deceive, 
knowledge of falsity, or even negligence on the part of the 
“[t]he peculiarities of the prescription drug industry make dissemination of scientific 
research results an especially important and prevalent marketing tool.” Id. at 63. 
149 Gordon & Breach Sci. Publishers S.A. v. Am. Inst. of Physics, 859 F. Supp. 
1521, 1544–45 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that, while the publication of a comparative 
survey of academic publishers was protected speech under the First Amendment, 
the dissemination of the results to librarians were subject to the Lanham Act). 
150 Id. at 1544 (first and fourth alterations in original) (citation omitted). 
151 Id. at 1544–45. 
152 See, e.g., POM Wonderful LLC v. Purely Juice, Inc., 362 F. App’x 577, 579 
(9th Cir. 2009) (“It is settled that intent is not an element of a Lanham Act false 
advertising claim.”). 
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defendant in order to succeed with a claim.153  For a defendant, 
honest intentions or good intent is no defense.154  Where a hard, 
verifiable statement is made that is capable of scientific 
verification, courts and agencies will assume that the recipient of 
the communication will treat the statement as including an 
implicit representation by the advertiser that such verification 
has been made.155  Misstatements in advertising cannot be 
protected by ambiguities and relied upon as defenses.156 
As an advertising vehicle, “scientific establishment claims” 
that rely on a scientific study in order to establish the superiority 
of one product over another are particularly effective.157  As a 
result, case law has consistently applied a stricter standard of 
review for marketing activities that purport to be based on 
scientific testing158 or that compare one company’s product with 
that of a competitor.159 
153 See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 631 F.2d 186, 189 (2d 
Cir. 1980) (stating that the false advertising tort “differs from the common law 
action for trade disparagement in two important respects: (1) it does not require 
proof of intent to deceive, and (2) it entitles a broad range of commercial parties to 
relief”); Am. Broad. Co. v. Maljack Prods., Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 665, 677 (N.D. Ill. 
1998) (“[In a false advertising suit about footage of Princess Diana’s funeral, the] 
BBC’s good faith but mistaken belief in its copyright is not a defense to an action 
under § 43(a). ‘The well-settled rule is that there is no requirement under the 
Lanham Act that a false representation be made willfully or with the intent to 
deceive.’ ” (quoting Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., No. 93 C 5041, 1997 WL 
798907, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 24, 1997))). 
154 See, e.g., Am. Broad. Co., 34 F. Supp. 2d at 677 (“[The] BBC’s good faith but 
mistaken belief in its copyright is not a defense to an action under § 43(a).”). 
155 See, e.g., Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d 160, 169 
(2d Cir. 1978) (analyzing competing Lanham Act claims by the producers of over-the-
counter pain medications where advertising claims were based on clinical trials). 
156 Id. at 166. 
157 Charles J. Walsh & Marc S. Klein, From Dog Food to Prescription Drug 
Advertising: Litigating False Scientific Establishment Claims Under the Lanham 
Act, 22 SETON HALL L. REV. 389, 392 (1992) (citing research that notes the 
effectiveness of comparative advertising that includes a source of higher credibility). 
158 See, e.g., Rhone-Poulenc Roror Pharm., Inc. v. Marion Merrell Dow, Inc., 93 
F.3d 511, 514–15 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that “where defendant has hyped the claim
of superiority by attributing it to the results of scientific testing, plaintiff must prove
only ‘that tests [relied upon] were not sufficiently reliable to permit one to conclude
with reasonable certainty that they established the proposition for which they were
cited.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Castrol, Inc. v. Quaker State Corp., 977 F.2d
57, 62–63 (2d Cir. 1992))).
159 See, e.g., Castrol Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d 939, 944 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(enjoining claims that Pennzoil motor oil outperformed Castrol motor oil with 
respect to viscosity breakdown); McNeil-P.C.C., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 938 
F.2d 1544, 1549 (2d Cir. 1991) (enjoining claims that Excedrin was scientifically
superior to Tylenol at relieving pain); Church & Dwight Co. v. Clorox Co., 840 F.
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CONCLUSION 
The United States Supreme Court has noted that 
“advertising which ‘links a product to a current public debate’ is 
not thereby entitled to the constitutional protection afforded 
noncommercial speech.”160  ONY has the potential to blur this 
rule and further complicate the already-complex jurisprudence 
surrounding the regulation of commercial speech.  The ONY 
decision sets a precedent that could foreclose adjudication of false 
advertising disputes in industries where marketing relies heavily 
on claims based upon scientific validation.  Under ONY, an 
advertiser could immune itself to a Lanham Act claim by simply 
relying on peer-reviewed scientific articles in academic 
publications.  These scientific articles would be outside the scope 
of the Lanham Act, even if the author of the scientific journal 
article received financial support from the future advertiser.161 
The Eastman decision returns the boundaries between 
commercial and noncommercial speech to their appropriate 
spheres.  Under Eastman, advertisers are responsible for the 
truth of the material they distribute—including the use of peer-
reviewed academic articles—in advertising or promotion, 
regardless of its original source.  As the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted, the application of the 
Lanham Act will not stifle academic freedom or intrude on the 
First Amendment.162  The Lanham Act only applies to statements 
made “in connection with any advertising, promotion, offering for 
sale, or sale of goods or services.”163  Under Eastman, scientists 
and academics will continue to be able to research and publish. 
Supp. 2d 717, 722–23 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (enjoining commercial claims as literally false 
because tests supporting the claims regarding each party’s cat litter were 
unreliable). 
160 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983) (quoting Cent. 
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 n.5 (1980)); see 
also Eastman Chem. Co. v. PlastiPure, Inc., 775 F.3d 230, 236 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(“Advertisements do not become immune from Lanham Act scrutiny simply because 
their claims are open to scientific or public debate.”). 
161 See ONY, Inc. v. Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc., 720 F.3d 490, 493–94, 497 
(2d Cir. 2013) (noting that advertiser Chiesi hired several medical doctors to present 
findings regarding infant mortality rates, and that these findings ultimately led to 
publication in the peer-reviewed journal). 
162 Eastman Chem. Co., 775 F.3d. at 237 (“Application of the Lanham Act to 
Appellants’ promotional statements will not stifle academic freedom or intrude on 
First Amendment values.”). 
163 Id. 
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It is only those who distribute or use those research findings in 
subsequent advertising or promotion who could find themselves 
subject to a Lanham Act claim.164 
Although the ONY decision may seem on its face to only 
impact the use of science in advertising, the decision has the 
potential to greatly affect the public.  First, as noted earlier, the 
decision has the potential to foreclose adjudication of false 
advertising disputes in industries where marketing relies heavily 
upon scientific validation.  Most significantly, a company’s 
distribution of a scientific article moves the scientific findings 
from the scientific community and academics and into the realm 
of the general public, which is more likely to trust scientific 
claims and much less likely to understand or investigate the 
research methodology behind those scientific claims.  For that 
reason, the Fifth Circuit’s Eastman decision reflects the proper 
scope of the Lanham Act’s application for the use of scientific 
research findings. 
164 Id. (“Appellants may continue to pursue their research and publish their 
results; they simply may not push their product by making the claims the jury found 
to be false and misleading.”). 
